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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
THE HISTORY OF THE MISSOURI LAW OF SEALED
INSTRUMENTS
BY ROBERT E. ROSENWALD
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of seals antedates by many centuries the Norman
Conquest, when they first were introduced into England,' there-
after to become an essential element in the common law.2 The
Bible contains a number of references to seals;3 they are men-
tioned in the plays of Shakespeare.4 A proper analysis of the
subject under discussion would not be complete without a very
brief reference to these historical antecedents, in order to pre-
sent a correct perspective. The direct source of seals in Mis-
souri is the common law.5  Courts in this State have adopted
Chancellor Kent's definition of the seal as "an impression upon
wax, wafer, or some other tenacious substance capable of being
impressed."c' They also take the view that at common law a
seal imports consideration,7 although Professor Williston asserts
that this statement is "absurd historically.",, Thus it may be
seen that the fundamental elements of the common law seal have
been recognized by Missouri courts in cases involving the law of
contracts.
A complete treatment of the law of sealed instruments would
necessitate a consideration of both public and private seals, in-
cluding corporate seals. Such a subject would be too broad to
be included within the confines of this paper. Accordingly, it
12 BLA. CoMt. 305.
'Crownhart, Seals, 34 CENTRAL L. J. 279, 280.
31 KINGS, c. 21; DANIEL, c. 6; ESTHER, C. 8; JEREmIAH, c. 32.
'MERCHANT OF VENICE, act IV, scene 1, line 139; HENRY THE EIGHTH,
act II, scene 4, line 222.
'Gates v. State (1850) 13 Mo. 11; Swink v. Thompson (1861) 31 Mo.
336.
a4 KENT, COm. 452; Gates v. State (1850) 13 Mo. 11; Swink v. Thomp-
son (1861) 31 Mo. 336; Pease v. Lawson (1862) 33 Mo. 35.
'County of Montgomery v. Auchley (1887) 92 Mo. 126, 4 S. W. 425;
Swift v. Central Union Fire Ins. Co. (1919) 279 Mo. 606, 216 S. W. 935;
Wulze v. Shaefer (1889) 37 Mo. App. 551; Greer v. Nutt (1893) 54 Mo.
App. 1.
81 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, sec. 109.
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has been necessary to delimit the problem. A thorough study of
the history of private seals has been undertaken, with references
to the law of corporate seals after 1893. Several cases relating
to public seals have been discussed in order to determine what
constitutes a sufficient sealing.
The Missouri law of sealed instruments, except for an act of
1822, shows the effect of evolution on the law of contracts. The
act to which reference has been made, is a legal sport and may
be considered separately. It provided, in part, that "all writings
. . . without seal or seals, stipulating for the payment of money
or property, or for the performance of any act or acts, duty or
duties, shall be placed on the same footing with sealed writings,
containing the like stipulations, receiving the same considera-
tion in all courts of justice, or before justices of the peace; and
to all intents and purposes having the same force and effect, and
upon which the same species of action may be founded as if
sealed; provided, that in all actions founded on such writings,
the consideration may be enquired into, either in a court of law
or equity, whether they be under seal or not."9
The law was short-lived, and was repealed in 1825,o before it
had been construed by the Supreme Court. A perusal of the
law shows that it departed widely from the common law, and its
early repeal is evidence that it was enacted long before lawyers
and laity were prepared for such a radical change. With the
exception of this act, which was a unique piece of legislation for
its time, the law of sealed instruments developed in regular and
orderly fashion in Missouri.
II. 1807-1893
A. What is a sufficient sealing
The Legislature of the Territory of Louisiana, out of which
the State of Missouri later was carved, passed an act in 1807
providing that "any instrument in writing to which the person
executing the same shall affix a scroll- by way of seal, shall be
adjudged and holden to be of the same force and obligation as if
'1 Ter. Laws p. 940.
R. S. Mo. (1825) P. 500, sec. 13.
U The words "scroll," "scrall," and "scrawl," have been used interchange-
ably by the courts.
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it were actually sealed."'12 This law remained in effect until
1822 when it was repealed by the Legislature of the State of Mis-
souri,3 but in 1825 it was re-enacted in a substantially similar
form.' 4 An amendment of the statute in 1835 provided for the
addition of the words, "expressed on the face thereof to be
sealed," after the word "writing," and the statute as amended
continued to be the law until 1893.1
In 1844, in the case of Glasscock v. Glasscock & Dodd in which
the action was brought on two notes, not actually sealed but
with scrawls annexed to the signatures, and within these scrawls
the word "seal" written in full, it was held that the instrument
was not sealed within the meaning of the statute, there being
no recognition of the scrawl as a seal in the body of the instru-
ment. Judge Scott of the Supreme Court said, "The construc-
tion put upon our statute, making a writing, to which there was
annexed a scrawl by way of a seal, a sealed instrument, was
adopted in analogy to the interpretation put upon a similar law
of the State of Virginia. Judge Tucker of that State, in one of
the early cases on this subject, placed this construction, on the
ground that it was necessary, in order to prevent unsealed
instruments from being converted into sealed ones by the bare
annexation of a scrawl, which could not be so easily affixed if
the scrawl was recognized as a seal in the body of the instru-
ment. The word seal being written within the scrawl, does not
show that the instrument was intended to be a sealed one. That
can only be shown by what appears on the face of the instrument.
This case is neither within the letter nor spirit of the former
decisions, the law of which seems to have been recognized by the
general assembly, at the late revision (1835) of a change in the
phraseology of the former statute adopting those decisions."1
The former decisions to which the court referred,7 and sub-
'1 Ter. Laws p. 115, see. 27; see Rector & Conway v. Honore (1822) 1
Mo. 204; Caples v. Branham (1855) 20 Mo. 244.
1 Ter. Laws p. 854, sec. 64.
"R. S. Mo. (1825) p. 215, sec. 3; see R. S. Mo. (1825) p. 627, sec. 22.
'R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 118, see. 3; R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 216, sec. 5; R. S.
Mo. (1855) p. 352, sec. 5; R. S. Mo. (1866) p. 398, sec. 5; R. S. Mo. (1879)
sec. 662; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 2388; Mo. Laws 1893, p. 117.
8 Mo. 577.
Cartmill v. Hopkins (1830) 2 Mo. 220; Boynton v. Reynolds (1831) 3
Mo. 79; Walker v. Keile (1843) 8 Mo. 301.
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sequent18 ones are in accord with the Glasscock case to the ef-
feet that the maker of the instrument should show by some ex-
pression in the body or testimonium thereof that he intended it
to be taken as a specialty, when a scrawl is used instead of a
seal, under the statute.
In several cases the question has been raised as to what is a
sufficient scrawl within the meaning of the law. The word
"seal" printed between brackets has been held to satisfy the
terms of the statute. 9 Likewise where a scrawl has been ap-
pended to the name of the party signing the instrument with the
word "seal" written therein, this is sufficient.20  On the other
hand, if the word "seal" is written opposite the grantor's name
in a deed, but is not surrounded by any scrawl or other device,
the terms of the law have not been complied with.21 In a case in
which scrawls were placed opposite the names of two grantors
in a deed, and the deed purported to have been executed under
the hands and seals of three grantors, and was acknowledged as
the deed of all, the validity of the deed was upheld. The court
decided that "in such a case, it is not necessary that a separate
seal should be placed to each name. If it appears that the seal
affixed was intended to be adopted as the seal of each, it was
sufficient." 22
The statute to which reference has been made, and the cases
decided under the statute show a considerable relaxation from
the common law. However, it is evident that the law had not
dispensed with many of the technical requirements which for-
merly attended the sealing of specialties.
In the case of Boynton v. Reynolds, decided in 1831, the Su-
preme Court made it clear that the statutory method permitting
the use of a scrawl by way of a seal, was not the exclusive means
Grimsley v. Admr's of Riley (1838) 5 Mo. 280, 32 Am. Dec. 319; Moreau
v. Detchemendy (1853) 18 Mo. 522; Moreau v. Branham (1858) 27 Mo.
351; Moreau v. Detchemendy (1867) 41 Me. 431; Groner v. Smith (1872)
49 Mo. 318; State ex rel. v. Eldridge (1877) 65 Mo. 584; Dickens v. Miller
(1882) 12 Mo. App. 408.
Underwood v. Dollins (1871) 47 Mo. 259.
Samuels v. Shelton (1871) 48 Mo. 444.
= Dunn v. Raley (1874) 58 Mo. 134.
Lunsford v. La Motte Lead Co. (1873) 54 Mo. 426, 436; accord, Burnett
v. McCluey (1883) 78 Mo. 676.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol16/iss2/2
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of sealing instruments. The common law seal was not replaced
by the scrawl.23 Subsequent cases are in accord.
24
What constituted a sufficient sealing in Missouri, aside from
the statutory scrawl? In a case in which the validity of a deed
was summoned into question, the objection was raised that no
impression was made on the wafer, and so, although everything
else had happened necessary to a valid sealing, yet the want of
this crowning requisite was fatal. Judge Dryden held that the
instrument was properly sealed, saying, "The common law pre-
scribed no particular instrument with which to make the im-
pression, nor fixed the breadth or length or depth it should be
made, and as the execution of this paper was attended with the
usual circumstances of deliberation, and as it was manifestly
intended as a sealed instrument, and as the scalloped paper, when
applied to the wafer and caused to adhere, must from a physical
necessity have made an impression, we feel warranted, for the
effectuation of the clear intention of the parties, in regarding
the scalloped paper a sufficient instrument, and the impression
made by it to cause cohesion, a sufficient impression to comply
with the requirement of the law."'2  The court arrived at a
similar conclusion where the seal was attached with mucilage
instead of a wafer.-6 In both cases the Supreme Court took a
liberal view, and it seems that no injustice was done in uphold-
ing the validity of these instruments.
A sharp distinction is drawn in cases involving presumptions
as to sealing where a copy of a deed is before the court, depend-
ing on the question of whether the instrument is the deed of a
private individual or a sheriff. The case of Dickens v. Miller 2
involved a certified copy of a deed from one Rebecca Hooper to
one Dempson Hooper. An effort was made to show that there
was a proper scrawl affixed to the instrument in order to bring
it within the terms of a statutory sealing, but this effort was un-
S3 Mo. 79.
'Pease v. Lawson (1862) 33 Mo. 35; State ex rel. v. Thompson (1872)
49 Mo. 188; Dale v. Wright (1874) 57 Mo. 110; Dingee v. Kearney (1876)
2 Mo. App. 515; Dickens v. Miller (1882) 12 Mo. App. 408; St. Louis Dairy
Co. v. Sauer (1884) 16 Mo. App. 1.
"Pease v. Lawson (1862) 33 Mo. 35, 40.
Turner v. Field (1869) 44 Mo. 382.
"(1832) 12 Mo. App. 408.
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successful. The court refused to admit the deed into evidence,
and this was complained of as error. The appellant claimed
that the court should have indulged in the presumption that the
original instrument had affixed thereto a common law seal. The
Saint Louis Court of Appeals refused to sustain the contention
and took judicial notice of the fact that the common law seal was
not used by private persons in this state. The Court, however,
did conclude that the presumption would be otherwise where
public seals were involved, and this presumption was generally
recognized whenever copies of sheriffs' deeds were introduced
into evidence.28
Equity gives relief to the vendee in cases where a deed is de-
fective because it lacks a seal, and compels the vendor and his
heirs, and all other persons claiming under him without notice,
and even purchasers for a valuable consideration, if with notice,
to make good the conveyance. Thus it was decreed in a case in
which the instrument lacked a seal, but concluded with the
words, "in witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and
seal," that a subsequent purchaser with notice should convey
the legal title to the first purchaser.29
In the case of a mortgage which was not sealed as required
by law, the court said, "It is very true this does not comply with
the statutory requirements in reference to seals, but the mort-
gage is not in consequence thereof avoided. A mortgage may be
irregular where the seal is omitted, or not in accordance with
law, but it will nevertheless be valid to create a lien, a trust for
the benefit of the creditor, which can be enforced in equity."' 3
This is the general rule."
B. Instruments under seal
Professor Williston has said that "contracts under seal were
Geary v. City of Kansas (1875) 61 Mo. 378; Norfleet v. Russel (1876)
64 Mo. 176; Parkinson v. Caplinger (1877) 65 Mo. 290; Addis v. Graham
(1885) 88 Mo. 197. McCoy v. Cassidy (1888) 96 Mo. 429, expressly over-
ruled Hamilton v. Boggess (1876) 63 Mo. 290, in which a contrary opinion
had been rendered.
" Mastin v. Halley (1875) 61 Mo. 196; Martin v. Nixon (1887) 92 Mo. 26.
A mortgage, although not under seal, imports notice to subsequent pur-
chasers. McClurg v. Phillips (1874) 57 Mo. 214.
Dunn v. Raley (1874) 58 Mo. 134.
McClurg v. Phillips (1872) 49 Mo. 315; Jones v. Brewington (1874) 58
Mo. 210; Harrington v. Fortner (1874) 58 Mo. 468.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol16/iss2/2
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enforced at common law by the action of covenant unless the
contract was for the payment of a fixed sum of money. In that
case debt was the exclusive remedy until the seventeenth cen-
tury. Afterwards covenant became a concurrent remedy.",?
Blackstone also was of the opinion that the action of debt would
lie for certain instruments under seal.33 In Missouri, however,
it seems that covenant was the proper form of action before the
adoption of the code," while debt would lie only in actions on
contracts not under seal.36 In actions of ejectment, of course,
sealed instruments were referred to collaterally, and the court
determined whether the instrument was properly sealed.'o
In Brown v. Lockhart, decided in 1823, the court said, "A
sealed instrument is ... a deed, a bond, a covenant, a sale, etc.,
but a sealed instrument is never a note.'1 37 And in a case in
1898 the court held that "under all of the authorities a sealed
instrument is a deed, whether it be a conveyance of land or a
bond or a contract of any kind between the parties."38 For
purposes of classifying sealed instruments, the first definition is,
perhaps, more satisfactory than the second although it is not all-
inclusive. Specialties in this state were deeds for the convey-
ance of lands;39 releases,4 o bonds, 41 and powers of attorney.42 To
this group may be added formal written promises such as for the
hire and keep of slaves.43 Not satisfied with the common law
rule that deeds for the conveyance of lands were required to be
2'1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, sec. 5.
"2 BLA. CoM. 465.
"Brown v. Lockhart (1823) 1 Mo. 409.
Boynton v. Reynolds (1831) 3 Mo. 79.
Walker v. Keile (1843) 8 Mo. 301.
(1823) 1 Mo. 409.
Edmunds v. Electric Light & Power Co. (1898) 76 Mo. App. 610.
Moreau v. Detchemendy (1853) 18 Mo. 522; Moreau v. Branham (1858)
27 Mo. 351; Swink v. Thompson (1861) 31 Mo. 336; Pease v. Lawson (1862)
33 Mo. 35; Moreau v. Detchemendy (1867) 41 Mo. 431; McCoy v. Cassidy
(1888) 96 Mo. 429; Dickens v. Miller (1882) 12 Mo. App. 408.
4 Riley v. Kershan (1873) 52 Mo. 224; Arnett v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. (1912)
164 Mo. App. 368; Judd v. Walker (1911) 158 Mo. App. 156.
" State ex rel. v. Clay County (1870) 46 Mo. 231; State ex rel. v. Thomp-
son (1872) 49 Mo. 188; State ex rel. v. Eldridge (1877) 65 Mo. 584; St.
Louis Dairy Co. v. Sauer (1884) 16 Mo. App. 1.
St. Louis Dairy Co. v. Sauer (1884) 16 Mo. App. 1.
Grimsley v. Adm'rs of Riley (1838) 5 Mo. 280, 32 Am. Dec. 319.
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under seal, the Legislature wrote this stipulation into the statu-
tory law.4"
The rule of strict construction was applied to instruments
under seal. It has been held in an action on an attachment bond
that the sureties are not liable thereon where the instrument is
unsealed,"4 although such an instrument might be sued upon as a
simple contract.46 The rule was that an authority to an agent to
execute an instrument under seal, whenever this was not done in
the presence of the principal, had itself to be under seal. And
by the common law decisions a subsequent ratification also had
to be under seal.4 - A method of avoiding the harsh rules here
invoked was discussed in the case of Shuetze v. Bailey in an
action involving personal property. The court said, "We think
the case comes within the reasoning that would make this the
contract of the principal, but as a contract under seal, it is in-
effectual for want of an authority under seal. Now if this was
an instrument affecting real estate, this result would be con-
clusive of the case; but when the contract relates to personal
property only, or is a mere agreement to pay money, although
void as a contract under seal, the seal is unnecessary, and may
be disregarded as surplusage, and it will be good as a contract
not under seal, provided there were authority by parol for its
execution.""4 The explanation of this case is to be found in the
fact that all transactions relating to reality had to be under seal,
while this was not true of personalty.
The cases to which reference has been made show the many
fine distinctions and the numerous technical decisions which the
court had to resort to while seals were essential elements of the
law of contracts in Missouri.
C. Procedure under the statutes
In 1835 the Legislature enacted a law which provided, "All
notes in writing made and signed by any person or his agent,
" R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 221, sec. 15; R. S. Mo. (1855) p. 358, sec. 15; G. S.
Mo. (1866) p. 444, sec. 7; R. S. Mo. (1879) sec. 674; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec.
2401. See Harris v. Sconce (1896) 66 Mo. App. 345.
"St. Louis Dairy Co. v. Sauer, note 42 above.
' Saline County v. Sappington .(1876) 64 Mo. 72.
"St. Louis Dairy Co. v. Sauer, note 42 above; Hawks v. McGroarty
(1892) 110 Mo. 546, 19 S. W. 830.
' (1867) 40 Mo. 69, 75.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol16/iss2/2
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whereby he shall promise to pay to any other person, or his
order, or unto bearer, any sum of money or property therein
mentioned, shall import a consideration, and be due and payable
as therein specified." 49 The law was amended in 1855 so that
the word "instruments" replaced the word "notes," and the
statute, substantially as amended has continued in effect to
date.50 The effect of the 1855 amendment was to broaden the
scope of contracts which were to import consideration so as to
extend it to writings other than negotiable notes.5 '
The law has been construed to -mean that in an action on a
sealed instrument, failure of consideration must be alleged in
the pleadings, or consideration will be presumed. The effect of
the statute was to abrogate the old common law rule that the seal
conclusively imported consideration.5 2 This is a significant de-
parture from the law of Blackstone's day, and placed sealed in-
struments in the same category with simple contracts as far as
consideration was concerned.
A second procedural statute, which has had practically the
same effect as the law which has just been considered, was first
enacted in 1845. It provided, "Whenever a specialty or other
written contract for the payment of money, or for the per-
formance of a duty, shall be the foundation of an action or de-
fense in whole or in part, or shall be given in evidence in any
court without being pleaded, the proper party may prove the
want or failure of the consideration, in whole or in part, of such
specialty or other written contract."r3 The law, unmodified, con-
tinues in effect,14 although subsequent legislation virtually has
obliterated the distinction between specialties and other con-
tracts. One significant feature of this statute is that it fails to
" R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 104, sec. 1; R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 189, sec. 1.
'R. S. Mo. (1855) p. 319, sec. 1; G. S. Mo. (1866) p. 398, sec. 6; R. S.
Mo. (1879) sec. 663; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 2389; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 894;
R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 2774; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 2160.
SHuffman v. Trust Co. (1896) 68 Mo. App. 177.
'County of Montgomery v. Auchley (1887) 92 Mo. 126, 4 S. W. 425;
Wulze v. Schaefer (1889) 37 Mo. App. 551; Greer v. Nutt (1893) 54 Mo.
App. 1.
R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 832, sec. 19.
"R. S. Mo. (1855) p. 1290, sec. 24; G. S. Mo. (1866) p. 686, sec. 24; R. S.
Mo. (1879) sec. 3725; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 2090; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec.
645; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 1974; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 1404.
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include "property" in the same category with "money" and
"duty." However, the omission is rendered unimportant, be-
cause the first law which was set forth makes specific reference
to "property."
Speaking in the case of Smith v. Busby, decided in 1852, Judge
Scott said, "At common law, a failure of the consideration of a
bond, whether partial or total, was no defence to an action on
the instrument. A partial or total failure of the consideration
of a note might be used as a defence to an action. Our statute
has now abolished all distinctions between bonds and notes in
this respect, and a failure of consideration, in whole or in part,
may be given in evidence to defeat or diminish the recovery in
an action on the instrument."' 5
Under this statute it has been held that courts of both law and
equity have authority to inquire into the question of considera-
tion, even though the instrument is under seal."
D. .Trend of the period
After the middle of the nineteenth century it became clear
that Missouri courts were construing the law of sealed instru-
ments with great liberality, and that the seal was becoming less
and less significant. In a case in which the validity of an in-
surance policy was questioned because the policy was not sealed,
the court sustained the policy on the ground that the insurance
company was not required by its charter to attach its common
seal to insurance contracts." In another case an action was
brought to recover damages for the breach of an official indemni-
fying bond of a constable. The objection that the instrument
was not under seal was held unavailing, the court taking the
position that the form of the bond required by statute was not
sealed and did not purport to be sealed "further than the word
bond would import a seal."" This action was brought in 1872,
and curiously enough the form to which the court referred was
first adopted in 1807, 9 when the law was strictly enforced that
15 Mo. 387, 391.
"Winter v. K. C. Cable Ry. Co. (1897) 73 Mo. App. 173.
' National Banking & Ins. Co. v. Knaup (1874) 55 Mo. 154.
-State ex rel. v. Dunn (1875) 60 Mo. 64, 72.
I Ter. Laws p. 143, sec. 5; R. S. Mo. (1825) p. 213, sec. 2; G. S. Mo.
(1866) p. 167, sec. 2.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol16/iss2/2
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all bonds should be under seal. In recognizing a modification
of the common law rule, in 1888, the Supreme Court held that if
an agent of a corporation was authorized by resolution to exe-
cute an instrument, this would dispense with the necessity of
affixing the corporate seal.'0
Judge Bliss once said, "We have been very liberal as to what
constitutes a common-law seal, but have never dispensed with a
seal in bonds and deeds, only as the statute substitutes a scrawl
in lieu thereof. It might be very well, as has been done in some
states, to dispense with seals altogether, but courts cannot so
change the law, and those who desire the change must look to the
law-making power." 61
The St. Louis Court of Appeals expressed itself in no uncertain
language in a case handed down in 1882. Judge Thompson said,
"Private seals have long ceased to be of any value in the authen-
tication of written instruments, and the rule which preserves
the distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments, where
so executed, is entirely technical and formal. But it is inter-
woven with our law of real property, and preserved in our
statute law. We cannot, therefore, disregard it, and we must
accordingly hold that the learned judge committed no error in
refusing to admit this so-called deed in evidence."' 2
At the time this decision was rendered, private seals were no
more than the vestigial remains of the common law, carried for-
ward into a new era characterized by its complex economic and
social structure. Seals had long since passed their heyday, and
soon were to be almost completely obliterated by statute.
III. 1893-1930
The act of 1893 was revolutionary in its nature. It provided,
"The use of private seals in written contracts, conveyances of
real estate, and all other instruments of writing heretofore re-
quired by law to be sealed (except the seals of corporations), is
hereby abolished, but the addition of a private seal to any such
instrument shall not in any manner affect its force, validity or
Campbell v. Pope (1888) 96 Mo. 468.
State ex rel. v. Thompson (1872) 49 Mo. 188, 189.
'Dickens v. Miller (1882) 12 Mo. App. 408, 409.
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character, or in any way change the construction thereof. 63
The law continues in effect.64
Curiously enough, the first case which arose after the passage
of this law, completely disregarded it. In Arnett v. Mo. Pac.
Ry. Co., heard before the Kansas City Court of Appeals in 1896,
the court said, "Satisfaction may be accomplished, or shown, in
two ways: One, as a matter of law, by a technical release (of a
joint tort feasor) under seal; and the other as a matter of fact.
To constitute the former, there must be a technical release under
seal, and when so executed it is conclusive on the party injured
and will be deemed a satisfaction in law." 5
However, when a similar case arose in 1912 before the same
court, reference was made to the Arnett case, and the court con-
cluded that the former case probably was decided before the trial
court or counsel knew that the law had been changed. In the
1912 case, the court made specific reference to the statute and
let it be understood that a seal did not any longer import con-
sideration.6
In a criminal case which arose four years after the law was
enacted, the defendant was accused of forging a deed. He re-
quested the court to instruct the jury that a deed was an instru-
ment under seal. On appeal the Supreme Court held that such
an instruction would have been erroneous and was properly re-
fused, and specifically referred to the statute in so doing.-
In the leading case of Pullis v. Pullis Iron Co., 8 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1900, the question arose as to the validity of a
deed of a corporation, since the instrument was not under seal.
It was admitted that the corporation had no seal, but the plain-
tiff contended that under the statutes of Missouri a corporation
could not convey land unless the deed was sealed with the cor-
porate seal. The court discussed the law of 1893 as it related to
earlier legislation concerning conveyances of corporations, and
concluded that since a corporation had power to adopt a seal, but
* Mo. Laws 1893, p. 117.
R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 893; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 2773; R. S. Mo. (1919)
see. 2159.
" 64 Mo. App. 368.
"Funk v. Kansas City (1912) 208 S. W. 840; accord, Judd v. Walker
(1911) 158 Mo. App. 156, 133 S. W. 655.
State v. Tobie (1897) 141 Mo. 547, 42 S. W. 1076.(1900) 157 Mo. 565, 57 S. W. 1095.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol16/iss2/2
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
was not required to do so, the law should be construed to mean
that whenever a corporation had a seal, it was necessary to affix
it to a conveyance of'real estate, but that whenever it had no
seal, the deed would be effective as though it were the conveyance
of an individual, within the meaning of the statute. A further
qualification of the rule is that where a corporation has a seal
and it is not affixed to the deed, the deed is insufficient to convey
the legal title of the corporation, but such a conveyance will be
upheld in equity provided that the grantee already has taken
possession of the land.,9
In a case in which the defendant corporation sought to be re-
lieved from the liability on a judicial bond on the ground that it
lacked the corporate seal or was not ratified under seal, Judge
Trimble of the Kansas City Court of Appeals held that "The
whole truth of the matter is that the distinction between sealed
and unsealed instruments has been done away with to such an
extent that a judicial bond is no different from any other simple
contract except, of course, that where it is a statutory bond, it
must be given in compliance with, and under the circumstances
specified in, the statute authorizing it. But, so far as the form
of its execution is concerned and the power of the corporation
to thereafter ratify its unauthorized execution, there is no dif-
ference between a bond and any other simple contract. Hence,
we are of the opinion that a defendant cannot escape liability
on the ground that the bond in question lacked the corporate seal
or was not ratified under a seal." 7o
It has been held that even though a corporation has a seal,
contrary to the rule in regard to real property, a mortgage of
personal property by a corporation need not be under seal, since
at common law such a mortgage was not a specialty.71 But the
seal of a corporation makes the instrument prima facie evidence
of what it purports to be, while in the absence of the seal, proof
otherwise than by the instrument itself is required to establish
' Albers v. Paving & Crusher Co. (1916) 196 Mo. App. 265, 194 S. W. 61.
"State ex rel. v. Parke-Davis & Co. (1915) 191 Mo. App. 219, 227, 177
S. W. 1070. A detailed history of the law of corporate seals in Missouri ap-
pears in 10 Mo. LAW BuLL. 59.
1Strop v. Hughes (1907) 123 Mo. App. 544, 101 S. W. 149; Strop v.
Hughes (1907) 123 Mo. App. 547, 101 S. W. 146.
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the execution thereof.72 The rule is that the fact that a corporate
seal does not appear to the contract is not fatal.73
An action was brought on a quitclaim deed in the case of Bos-
ley & Bro. v. Bosley.74 The deed was under seal, but was not sup-
ported by any real consideration. It was contended that the de-
fendant was estopped to deny the want of consideration because
a seal was affixed to his signature, since this conclusively im-
ported a consideration. The court held that "Whatever may
have been the rule under the ancient common law, it is now . . .
well settled that in such proceedings as this courts of equity, at
least, will go behind the seal and inquire into the matter of con-
sideration. . . . But in addition to this our statute . . has
abolished the use of private seals in written contracts, except
only as to seals of corporations, and they are of no further con-
sequence. Whether such private seals be affixed to an instru-
ment or not they do not 'in any manner affect. its force, validity
or character, or in any way change the construction thereof.'"
In a recent case the question raised was whether an undis-
closed principal could be held liable for a breach of warranty
made by the agent in a deed executed in the latter's own name.
The court said that "it is the well-established common-law doc-
trine that an action can be maintained upon a sealed contract
only against those whose names appear therein; and hence the
general rule is that an undisclosed principal cannot be held liable
upon a contract under seal executed by an agent in his own name.
. . . From this it necessarily followed that conveyances of real
estate, being sealed instruments, came within the rule; and an
undisclosed principal could not be liable for the breach of a
covenant of warranty contained in a deed executed by an agent
in his own name." But the court pointed out that the distinction
which the common law made as to the liability of the principal
in sealed and unsealed instruments had been abolished in Mis-
souri by statute. Accordingly it was held that a principal was
liable for a breach of warranty by the agent.7 5
Sinclair Coal Co. v. Mining Co. (Mo. App., 1919) 207 S. W. 266.
Stevens v. Knights of Modern Maccabees (1910) 153 Mo. App. 196, 132
S. W. 757.
" (1900) 85 Mo. App. 424, 428. See Mueninghaus v. James (Mo. 1930)
24 S. W. (2d) 1017.
"Donner v. Whitecotton (1919) 201 Mo. App. 443, 212 S. W. 378.
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The effect of the law of 1893 and of the cases decided under
the law has been to increase the responsibility and the liability
of classes of persons, who before the act, continually sought the
refuge of a seal. The law is in harmony with the age, and the
benefit derived from it has been great.
IV. CONCLUSION
The several states of the United States may be classified in
three groups as regards the law of sealed instruments. In the
first are those states that adhere rather strictly to the common
law. These states have retained specialties although they have
relaxed the hard and fast rule as to the common law sealing.70
The second group includes Missouri and other st4tes, in which
the law of private seals has been greatly modified to provide for a
large increase in the kinds of instruments that are valid with-
out seals, although for certain purposes, generally in the con-
veyances of corporations, the use of seals is required by law.7
The states in the third group are those in which laws have been
enacted that in substance have abolished the distinction be-
tween sealed and unsealed instruments in all instances where a
private seal was required at common law.78
The trend of legislation in the United States and the tendency
of the Missouri courts are in the direction of the entire elimina-
tion of the private seal. Its origin is historical, its use tradi-
tional, its value insignificant. In Missouri, it seems that the seal
is essential only for the transfer of real estate by a corporation
which has a seal. If the corporation has no seal, it may dispose
of its real estate by a deed not under seal. As a result of this
distinction, corporations which possess seals and deal in real
estate, run a risk of having conveyances set aside when they
would be upheld if the corporations were without seals. In the
light of Missouri decisions, for a corporation to owft a seal is a
"Ga. Code (1926) sec. 4219; Cons. Laws N. Y. (Cahill, 1923) c. 23 secs.
43 and 44; Wis. Stat. (1927) sec. 235.17; R: S. Ill. (Cahill, 1929) c. 29 sec.
1, c. 30 sec. 47.
'R. S. Kan. (1923) c. 16 sec. 106, c. 17 sec. 60; G. S. Minn. (1923) secs.
6933, 7447:3, 7481; W. Va. Code Ann. (Barnes, 1923) c. 13 sec. 15, c. 72
secs. 25, 26, 27, c. 73 sec. 5.
1"Comp. Laws Colo. (1921) sec. 4883; Iowa Code (1924) sec. 9439; Gen.
Laws R. I. (1923) secs. 3017, 4270, 4278; Comp. Stats. Wash. (Remington,
1922) sec. 10556.
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liability rather than an asset. Furthermore, while mortgages of
real estate by corporations possessing seals, but failing to affix
them to such mortgages, are subject to attack, the same corpora-
tions can make chattel mortgages that are binding even in the
absence of seals. And finally, it seems that the Missouri courts,
particularly equity courts, have made the greatest efforts to sus-
tain conveyances which according to statute law would seem to
be invalid for want of a seal. Any single factor here set forth
should cause the Legislature to consider the advisability of aban-
doning entirely the use of private seals in Missouri, and all of
the factors considered together should make the decision of the
Legislature a question on which no reasonable man would have a
doubt.
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